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Abstract: Max Weber developed a distinctive view of the possibilities and 
polarities of modern politics. His thinking about popular sovereignty is 
placed here in the context of a long-running German debate about how to 
reconcile two principles, those of popular self-government from below 
and authority from above. Weber’s unwillingness to compromise these 
principles, or to subordinate one to the other, led him to adopt different 
positions at different times about the role of parliament and political 
parties in holding these two principles together in practice. As a result, he 
bequeathed no single set of bearings to the future. An attempt is made to 
show, by means of an analysis of the ways in which Weber developed his 
positions, and by a comparison of those positions with views developed 
in response by Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, that the question of 
whether Weber’s thought led directly to Schmitt’s or, indeed, to Kelsen’s, 
is a question mal posée.  What popular sovereignty means in an age of 
mass democracy remains an open question which we must answer for 
ourselves. 
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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF MASS DEMOCRACY 
Politics, parliament, and parties in Weber, Kelsen, Schmitt, and 
beyond 
 
§I 
‘In my view’, declared Leopold von Ranke in 1854, ‘the leading tendency 
of our time is the conflict between two principles, that of monarchy and 
that of popular sovereignty. All other conflicts and oppositions are 
connected to this one’.1 Ranke proceeded to admonish those who wished 
too devoutly to see history moving inexorably in the direction of the 
triumph of the second principle over the first following the revolutions of 
1848.  This was to misunderstand ‘what the bell had struck’.  So many 
destructive tendencies were bound up with the principle of popular 
sovereignty that both culture and Christendom would be put at risk if it 
decisively gained the upper hand.  Accordingly monarchy—‘hereditary 
 

 I have followed existing translations where possible, noting any amendments I have 
made. I have not tried to make quoted matter consistent with standard usage. Where 
no translations from German are available, I have made my own. I should like to 
thank John Dunn, Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner for comments on earlier 
versions of the chapter, Mark Philp for discussion of its contents, and the Director, 
Staff and Fellows of the Lichtenberg Kolleg, University of Göttingen, where the 
present version was completed. 
1
 Ranke, der neueren Geschichte, p. 141. 
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authority from above’ as against ‘self-government from below’2—had to 
be given its place, being necessary to eradicate those destructive 
tendencies which popular principles ‘swept in with them in a great 
flood’.3  The outstanding problem of Europe, he insisted, was how to 
reconcile these two principles with one another. It was a problem that 
could not be ignored.
4
           
The profound disquiet about popular sovereignty to which Ranke’s 
words gave resounding expression, and the matching desire for a contrary 
principle to nullify its projected effects, was widespread among Germans 
of the next generation. Some time after Ranke issued his admonition we 
find Friedrich Nietzsche considering the same problem in rather more 
apocalyptic terms. ‘I believe’ he confided to his notebook in the autumn 
of 1885, ‘that the great, advancing, and unstoppable democratic 
movement of Europe, that which calls itself ‘progress’…fundamentally 
signifies only the tremendous, instinctive conspiracy of the whole herd 
against everything that is shepherd…and Caesar, to preserve and elevate 
all the weak, the oppressed, the mediocre, the hard-done-by, the half-
failed; as a long-drawn-out slave revolt, at first secret, then more and 
more self-confident, against every kind of master, ultimately against the 
 
2
 Ibid., p. 139: ‘Nationalsouveränität und Monarchie, Erblichkeit von oben, 
Selbstregierung von unten’. 
3
 Ibid., p, 142.    
4
 Ranke, der neueren Geschichte, p. 143. 
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very concept of ‘master’’.  In Nietzsche’s view, all genuine instances of 
progress in human life had been ‘the work of an aristocratic society which 
believed in a long ladder of order of rank and difference in value between 
man and man [for] without the pathos of distance, as it arises from the 
deeply carved differences between the classes, from the ruling caste’s 
constant looking outwards and downwards unto its underlings’, the self-
development and ‘self-overcoming of man’ was impossible.5          
By the time German politicians of the generation after Nietzsche 
were forced to hastily improvise a new political system under the shadow 
of Bolshevism and out of the ruins of the second Reich, late in the 
autumn of 1918, anxiety about popular sovereignty had ripened in many 
segments of society into open resentment of democracy and 
parliamentary government.  The situation, however, seemed to admit of 
no alternative. The abdication of the Kaiser was announced on 9 
November and the following day the incoming Chancellor, Friedrich 
Ebert, informed the German public that the new government would be a 
government of the people. Thomas Mann spoke for many who felt 
themselves forced into a position they had never wished to occupy when 
he proclaimed ‘I want the monarchy…I don’t want this parliament and 
party business that will sour the whole life of the nation with its 
 
5
 Nietzsche, Writings, p. 68. 
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politics…I don’t want politics.  I want competence, order, and decency’.6 
Max Weber, who had identified himself as ‘a resolute follower of 
democratic institutions’ as early as 1905,7 also chose that moment to 
speak out in defence of monarchy.  Nothing seemed to him less desirable 
at this critical juncture than ‘a radical break from monarchic traditions’, 
even if his ‘support for the monarchy provoked general headshaking’ 
amongst disbelieving and disapproving friends and colleagues.
8
  
These observations bring me to the central problem to be 
considered in this chapter.  Where exactly did Weber position himself in 
what Ranke called the great movement ‘of action and reaction of minds’ 
incited by the problem of popular sovereignty and monarchy,
9
 and what 
was his legacy? This question has been fiercely debated by historians at 
least since the publication of Wolfgang Mommsen’s revisionist work of 
1959, Max Weber and German Politics, and interest only quickened with 
the dramatic intervention of the young Jürgen Habermas at a conference 
 
6
 Eschenburg, Die improvisierte Demokratie, p. 43, as cited in Kennedy, ‘Carl 
Schmitt’s Parlamentarismus’, p. xxiv.  For Mann’s general attitudes in this period, 
see his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1918), pp. 16-17, which denounced 
democracy as ‘foreign and poisonous to the German character’ and suggested that the 
‘much decried ‘authoritarian state’ is and remains the one that is proper and becoming 
to the German people, and the one they basically want’.  
7
 Weber, ‘Capitalism and Rural Society’, p. 370. 
8
 Mommsen, Max Weber, p. 291. 
9
 Ranke, der neueren Geschichte, p. 142. 
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at Heidelberg in 1964 to celebrate the centenary of Weber’s birth.10 At 
issue is not merely the depth of Weber’s commitment to democratic 
institutions but whether he was really committed to them at all.  For the 
views he developed in his later political writings, especially from 1919 
onwards, have struck numerous commentators as ‘hostile to the very 
spirit of democracy’ as a regime ‘uniquely committed’ to the realization 
of the principle of popular sovereignty.
11
  The predilection for ‘Caesarian’ 
or ‘leader democracy’ (Führerdemokratie) which those writings evinced, 
with a directly elected and powerful presidential figure, savoured to 
many, including Mommsen, of the illiberal nationalism of Wilhelmine 
Germany, but also looked forward to the decisionism of Carl Schmitt and, 
beyond that, into the darkness of Nazi dictatorship.
12
   
Mommsen argued that Weber’s support for the monarchical 
principle was the result of ‘technical considerations about the best form 
of government’.  Monarchy enjoyed a formal advantage over republican 
and other forms of popular government in that ‘the highest position in the 
state was permanently occupied’,13 thus providing a practical and 
 
10
 See Stammer (ed.), Max Weber and Sociology. 
11
 J. E. Green, ‘Max Weber’, 188. 
12
 See e.g Becker, ‘Der Römische Cäsar’, Mommsen, Max Weber, and, more 
guardedly, McCormick, ‘Legal Theory’; and compare Green, ‘Max Weber’, Kilker, 
‘Max Weber’. 
13
 Mommsen, Max Weber, p. 289. 
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constitutional limit to both the drive for power of personally ambitious 
politicians and the desire of the military to extend its power into the 
political sphere, averting the threat of ‘Caesarian domination [by] military 
parvenus’.14  But the ‘conservative strain’ in Weber’s political thought, as 
Mommsen called it, infected his plans for constitutional reform and 
emptied his professed commitment to democratic institutions of genuine 
resolution: it was to military parvenus, not to Caesarian domination, that 
Weber was opposed.
15
  A similar line of criticism was pursued by David 
Beetham when he objected that Weber’s account of democracy ‘makes no 
reference to democratic values, much less regards them as worth striving 
for’.  His theory of government, Beetham went on, ‘did not seek to justify 
such government in terms of recognizably democratic values, such as 
increasing the influence of the people on policies pursued by those who 
governed’.16 On the contrary, and as his advocacy for monarchy in 1918 
demonstrated, Weber was ambivalent at best about democratic values. In 
 
14
 Weber, ‘Capitalism and Rural Society’, p. 370. 
15
 Georg Lukács, who had been a member of Weber’s circle at the University of 
Heidelberg before the First World War, suggested in 1954 that Weber’s support for 
the institutions of democracy was a ‘technical measure to help achieve a better 
functioning imperialism’. See Lukács, Die Zerstörung, p. 488, cited in Green, ‘Max 
Weber’, 195. 
16
 Beetham, Max Weber, pp. 101-2. 
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the final analysis his valorisation of charismatic rulership was difficult to 
square with the democratic ideal of a sovereign people.
17
         
As the people took to the streets in the winter of 1918-19, Munich 
and Berlin became battlegrounds in which rival republics were noisily 
proclaimed and ruthlessly put down. Germany was engulfed by what 
Weber famously damned as ‘a bloody carnival that does not deserve the 
honourable name of a revolution’.18 It is little wonder, therefore, that his 
later writings could be interpreted as expressing a growing disaffection 
for popular power and a longing for authority, order and control.
19
   
This chapter argues, by contrast, that Weber should not be read as 
disavowing the principle of self-government in favour of authority, but 
instead as working towards his own novel response to the problem of how 
to conceive and apply these principles together in an age of mass 
democracy.
20
  His putative solution did not mean asserting one principle 
 
17
 For a comprehensive and illuminating discussion of the difficulty, see Derman, Max 
Weber, pp. 176-98. 
18
 Marianne Weber, Lebensbild, p. 642.  For the revolution, see Kolb, Weimar 
Republic, pp. 3-22, Hans Mommsen, Rise and Fall, pp. 20-50, Peukert, Weimar 
Republic, pp. 47-51.  
19
 See e.g. Kahler, Der Beruf der Wissenschaft, and compare the judgement of Max 
Horkheimer (Stammer (ed.), Max Weber, p. 53), who attended Weber’s lectures on 
socialism at the University of Munich in 1920, and came away sadly disappointed, 
convinced that ‘Max Weber must be ultraconservative’.  
20
 A similar conclusion is developed in a different direction by Jeffrey Edward Green, 
first in ‘Max Weber’, and now, more expansively, in Eyes of the People. 
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over the other, or compromising differences;
21
 rather it meant seeking the 
proper balance between the competing tendencies they represented. 
Naturally, this allowed for—indeed it required—different postures to be 
adopted at different times. In 1905-6 it meant throwing ones weight 
behind democratic institutions against the claims of ‘‘aristocracies’ and 
‘authorities’’ and ‘the rule of capitalism’.22 In 1918-19 it meant re-
establishing a balance against an unchecked politics of popular will by 
revitalising or drawing attention back to the virtues of leadership, 
individual responsibility, and independent judgement. This was as much 
an imaginative and rhetorical challenge as it was an institutional and 
political one—not just a matter of offering a theory or propounding a 
scientific truth, though Weber certainly thought he was doing that, but of 
trying to exhort his audience to certain modes of thought and action 
through his example
23
 and his words.
24
   
The challenge was heightened by the fact that the competing 
tendencies of thought about the constitution of government for which the 
principles of popular sovereignty and monarchy stood were given form 
 
21
 See Mommsen, ‘Antinomian Structure’, for this style of thinking as typical of 
Weber. 
22
 Weber, ‘Constitutional Democracy in Russia’, pp. 68-69.  
23
 For personality and personal contact as an important contributory element in the 
formation of Weber’s posthumous reputation, see Derman, ‘Skepticism and Faith’, 
esp. 495-503.  
24
 See Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, pp. 145-46. 
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and content through a political vocabulary which, because common to 
both, was systematically ambiguous. Democracy, for instance, might 
suggest both the institutional means of limiting the exercise of political 
power and a plebiscitary device to legitimate the concentrated and 
extensive exercise of that power by a single individual. The practical 
meaning of such terms thus depended—as arguably it still does—on how 
these different ways of thinking were mediated.  
As John Dunn observes, democratic governments, at least 
presumptively, are governments whose rule is authorised by those whom 
they rule, and, in presumption again, so authorised not by a single 
mythical episode in the distant past, but by a series of iterative occasions 
over time. The point of these occasions is to recast every citizen as 
subject to democratic laws, ‘through some imaginatively accessible and 
pertinent set of mediations, and hence as part author of the laws to which 
each is subject’.25 The difficulty which Weber felt it necessary to confront 
was that, under the peculiar conditions of mass society, the mediations 
purporting to provide that authorisation were uniformly disreputable 
exercises in utopianism or self-deception. Modern democratic institutions 
and the bureaucracy that governed them operated according to the 
permeating rationalism and functionalist logic characteristic of modern 
European civilization, which, he argued, had brought about the 
 
25
 See Dunn, ‘Legitimacy and Democracy’, p. 9. 
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‘disenchantment of the world’ (Entzauberung der Welt).26 They were 
moved by reasons and forces entirely internal to them. What could 
democracy, what could popular sovereignty, mean in such circumstances 
as these?  It is the answers that Weber gave to this question, and the ways 
in which two of his successors, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, responded 
to those answers, that will be the principal focus of my attention in the 
remainder of this chapter.
27
                    
Three statements may be taken together as providing a prospectus 
for what follows. The first is found in the preamble to the Weimar 
Constitution of 1919 and runs: ‘The German people, united in every 
branch…has given itself this Constitution’. The guiding principle of the 
new constitution was that the German state was and should be the 
political organisation of the people: the people were the Reich and [as 
Article 1 went on to assert] ‘The German Reich is a Republic.  All state 
authority emanates from the people’.28  The second occurs in a letter 
written in 1908 by Weber to his young friend Robert Michels: ‘Any 
thought of removing the rule of men over men through even the most 
sophisticated forms of ‘democracy’ is ‘utopian’…concepts such as ‘the 
 
26
 Weber, ‘Science as a vocation’, p. 139. 
27
 The challenge laid down by Weber was also taken up, in different ways, by 
Friedrich Meinecke and Ernst Troeltsch to name only two. For Schmitt’s response to 
the former, see Schmitt, ‘Idee der Staatsräson’. 
28
 Hucko (ed.), The Democratic Tradition, p. 149, and compare p. 50. 
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will of the people’, the ‘true will of the people’, etc., ceased to exist for 
me long ago. They are fictions’.29  The third comes from Edmund 
Morgan’s account of the origins of self-government in England and the 
United States, Inventing the People.  ‘Government’, Morgan observes 
there, ‘requires make-believe…make believe that the voice of the people 
is the voice of God.  Make believe that the people have a voice or make 
believe that the representatives of the people are the people’.  In order to 
be effective [Morgan goes on] these ‘fiction[s] must bear some 
resemblance to fact…Because fictions are necessary, because we cannot 
live without them, we often take pains to prevent their collapse by 
moving the facts to fit the fiction, by making our world conform more 
closely to what we want it to be…the fiction takes command and reshapes 
reality’.30  
The principal purpose of the present chapter, then, is to explore the 
ways in which fact and fiction interacted in Weber’s thinking about 
popular sovereignty, politics, and the modern state, and how Hans Kelsen 
and Carl Schmitt reacted to what they found in Weber.  This notable 
triumvirate has already been discussed at length and with great distinction 
 
29
 Lepsius and Mommsen (eds.), Briefe, 1906-1908, p. 620, cited in Mommsen, Max 
Weber, pp. 394-95 (translation amended).  
30
 Morgan, Inventing the People, pp. 13-14.  For discussion, see Przeworski, 
Democracy, pp. 11-13. 
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in many books
31
 and my aim here is simply to analyse Weber’s account 
of democracy and the state as a late contribution to a movement of 
thought stretching back to Ranke. I hope by this means to put some of the 
more familiar aspects of the story in a new light, and thence to consider 
the views of Kelsen and Schmitt anew in that same light, before offering 
some brief reflections on the subsequent fortunes of those views and the 
prospects of popular sovereignty and democracy in the present age.  But 
to begin we must turn back to Weber. 
 
§II 
When Weber first applied his mind to politics it was in a practical context 
in which the German Reich under Bismarck had striven for several 
decades to impose a single scheme of law in the empire and, at least by 
implication, a single source of direction emanating from his will.
32
  The 
pulverising and depoliticising consequences for civil society of this 
 
31
 See, in addition to the works by Derman and Mommsen cited above, Baume, Hans 
Kelsen; Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty; Caserta, Democrazia e constituzione; Diner 
(ed.), Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt; Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy; Eberl, Die 
Legitimität; Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews; Herrera (ed.), Le droit, Le politique; 
Kalyvas, Democracy; Kelly, State of the Political; Korb, Kelsens Kritiker, pp. 135-48; 
Topitsch, Gottwerdung; Ulmen, Politischer Mehrwert; Zarone, Crisi e critica. 
32
 For Bismarck and the German Reich, compare Darmstaedter, Bismarck, pp. 172-
408; Michael Gross, The War against Catholicism, pp. 240-91; Pulzer, Germany, 
Chapter 2; and, at length, Pflanze, Bismarck.  For the Reich Constitution of 1871, see 
Hucko (ed.), The Democratic Tradition, pp. 22-38, 119-45.   
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assault were registered at the time by Otto von Gierke, among others, 
who looked to the medieval period to distil from the practice of the 
guilds, leagues, and corporations a tradition of pluralist thinking about the 
real personality of groups that had been sidelined and squashed by the 
modern state.
33
 In the process, Gierke had delivered an indirect but 
astringent commentary on the political situation of late nineteenth century 
Germany.  Weber’s commentary on the consequences of Bismarck’s 
policy, written towards the end of the Great War, which provided a yet 
more devastating commentary of its own, bespoke the same recognition, 
but it was more direct. 
Weber stated that Bismarck’s political legacy was ‘a nation entirely 
lacking in any kind of political education’.  Above all Bismarck had 
bequeathed to the future ‘a nation entirely without any political will, 
accustomed to assume that the great statesman at the head of the nation 
would take care of political matters for them’. Weber continued in words 
that must be quoted at length: 
 
Furthermore, as a result of his misuse of monarchic sentiment 
as a cover for his own power interests in the struggle between 
the political parties, he left behind a nation accustomed to 
submit passively and fatalistically to whatever was decided on 
 
33
 Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. 
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its behalf, under the label of ‘monarchic government,’ without 
criticising the political qualifications of those who filled the 
chair left empty by Bismarck and who seized the reins of 
government with such an astonishing lack of self-doubt. It was 
in this area that the most severe damage by far was done…At 
the same time his enormous prestige had the purely negative 
consequence of leaving parliament utterly without power…The 
powerlessness of parliament also meant that its intellectual 
level was very low [But] whether a parliament is of high or low 
intellectual quality depends on whether great problems are not 
only discussed but are conclusively decided there. In other 
words, it depends on whether anything happens in parliament 
and on how much depends on what happens there, or whether it 
is merely the reluctantly tolerated rubber-stamping machine for 
a ruling bureaucracy.
34
  
 
Weber’s complaint was that Bismarck had created an abyss within the 
state, between laws and policies which derived their authority from his 
personal cachet and the ovine acquiescence of the masses.  Individual will 
and judgment had no role to play in this situation except in the severely 
straitened sense that they could be read off mass obedience to law.  Both 
 
34
 Weber, ‘Parliament and Government’, pp. 144-45. 
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here and elsewhere in Weber’s writings,35 this complaint was 
reformulated as a wider statement about the nature of politics in the 
modern world. 
The steel-hard logic of modern politics, as Weber understood it, 
moved remorselessly towards a reckoning with three fundamental 
questions. The first was how is it possible to salvage any remnant of 
individual freedom worthy of the name in the face of an all-powerful 
trend towards bureaucratisation in the modern state? The second, we have 
seen, was how is democracy possible at all in the same conditions? The 
third was what sorts of person could carry the hopes of freedom and 
democracy responsibly in these conditions?
36
 Some of Weber’s answers 
are implicit in the remarks quoted above, but to understand how he 
arrived at those answers it is necessary to say a little more about his views 
of the twin crises of modern statehood and modern individuality.   
 
35
 For parliament, see e.g. Weber, ‘Bureaucracy’, pp. 232-39, ‘Suffrage and 
Democracy’, pp. 81-82, 96-106. For inadequate political education, see 
‘Bureaucracy’, pp. 240-44, ‘National Character and the Junkers’, pp. 388-9, and, 
entire, ‘The Profession and Vocation’.  
36
 Weber, ‘Parliament and Government’, pp. 159-61.  See also ‘Constitutional 
Democracy in Russia’, p. 69: ‘It is quite ridiculous to attribute to today’s high 
capitalism…any ‘elective affinity’ with ‘democracy’ or indeed ‘freedom’ (in any 
sense of the word), when the only question one can ask is how these things can 
‘possibly’ survive at all in the long run under the rule of capitalism’. 
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Already by 1895 Weber had concluded that it was a grave mistake 
to ascribe moral or metaphysical grandeur to the state and to think of it as 
‘elevated ever higher, the more its nature is shrouded in mystical 
obscurity’.37  The state was nothing other than ‘the worldly organisation 
of the nation’s power’ and must be understood in these terms. It was a 
bearer of ‘economic and political-power interests’, not values, and it 
could not be used to realise ultimate values or ‘to impose them on the 
future’.38 Still less could it impose them itself. This was firstly because it 
was not a ‘person’ or ‘personality’39 and secondly because modern 
politics was not a realm of ultimate values: ‘The fate of our times’, Weber 
repeated, ‘is characterised by rationalization and intellectualization and, 
above all, by the “disenchantment of the world”. Precisely the ultimate 
and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the 
transcendental realm…or into the brotherliness of direct and personal 
human relations’.40 The ends of life could not be institutionalised and 
 
37
 Weber, ‘The Nation State’, pp. 16-17.  Here Weber surely had in his sights not only 
Hegel, whose students had recalled him claiming that the state was ‘the march of God 
in the world’ but also Ranke, who had referred to states in Das politische Gesprach as 
‘spiritual substances...thoughts of God’.  Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 279, 
and Ranke, Geschichte und Politik, p. xxii.  
38
 Weber, ‘The Nation State’, p. 17, p. 15. 
39
 For Weber’s rejection of the ‘personality’ of the state, see Kelly, State of the 
Political, Chapter 3. 
40
 Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, p. 155.  
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could not be matters of public consensus. When ‘ultimate 
Weltangschauungen’ collided, as inevitably they did, one had ‘eventually 
to choose between them’,41 a matter of personal, not collective decision.  
Every individual living in the ‘world’ found ‘himself subject to the 
struggle between multiple sets of values, each of which, viewed 
separately, seems to impose an obligation on him. He has to choose 
which of these gods he will and should serve, or when he should serve the 
one and when the other.  But at all times he will find himself engaged in a 
fight against one or other of the gods of this world’.42 The state was 
different. By virtue of its ‘depersonalization’, it operated impartially, 
according to its own norms and ends, ‘sine ira et studio, without hate and 
therefore without love’, and was impervious to ‘substantive ethicization’. 
Its ends were simply those of power and its distribution.
43
     
This conclusion was powerfully affirmed in Weber’s casually 
shocking observation that the modern state was an ‘organisation’ 
(Betrieb) in exactly the same way as a factory.  In both cases ‘the 
relations of rule’ within the organisation were determined by ‘firmly 
established areas of responsibility, the keeping of files, [and] hierarchical 
 
41
 Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation’, p. 355. 
42
 Weber, ‘Between Two Laws’, pp. 78-79.  See also ‘Science as a Vocation’, p. 147-
48 
43
 Weber, ‘Religious Rejections’, p. 334.  
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structures of superiority and subordination’.44 Accordingly, from a social-
scientific point of view, the state was differentiated from other 
enterprises—such as factories—only by its means, being defined as ‘a 
human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of 
legitimate physical violence within a certain territory’, that is to say, a 
structure of domination.
45
  
One upshot of this insight was to enable Weber to argue for the 
democratisation of the German state against those ‘academic littérateurs’ 
who wished to see the Reich Constitution of 1871 preserved in perfection.  
If the state was an organisation which, in principle, functioned in a 
‘rationally calculable manner according to stable, general norms’, like ‘a 
machine’, it could and should be altered, as any machine would be 
adjusted, in the interests of operational efficiency.
46
  But it had disabling 
consequences too.  It became impossible, for one thing, to credit the idea 
that the state was the outcome of a voluntary and rational agreement, or 
 
44
 Weber, ‘Parliament and Government’, p. 146.  Betrieb has connotations of 
regularised purposive activity and may be translated into English variously as 
‘organisation’, ‘enterprise’, ‘firm’, ‘business’, ‘operation’ or the like (see Lassman 
and Speirs (eds.), Political Writings, p. 372).  For Weber’s own discussion of the term 
as meaning ‘continuous rational activity of a specified kind’, see his Economy and 
Society, pp. 52-53.  
45
 Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation’, pp. 310-11, ‘Religious Rejections’, p. 334. 
46
 Weber, ‘Parliament and Government’, pp. 266-71.  For discussion, see Derman, 
Max Weber, pp. 105-7. 
20 
 
that it derived its legitimacy from that source:  the ‘optimistic faith in the 
natural harmony of interests among free individuals’, Weber observed, 
had ‘nowadays been destroyed forever by capitalism’,47 while belief in 
natural law and objective universal values had gone the same way.  
Neither was it possible to regard the law of the state as having been 
authored by the people in any meaningful sense. Law was just one more 
‘rational, technical apparatus…continually transformable in the light of 
expediential considerations and devoid of all sacredness of content’. One 
peculiar side effect of this development, Weber noted in passing, was to 
have promoted ‘actual obedience to the power, now viewed solely from 
an instrumentalist standpoint, of the authorities who claim legitimacy at 
the moment’.48   
Weber was formally agnostic about whether what legitimacy those 
authorities possessed derived from charisma, tradition, or law,
49
 but his 
writings left the firm impression that for most people everything turned 
on a disposition to obedience. Whatever legitimacy the state enjoyed was 
more a matter of faith or belief, or indeed wishful thinking, on the part of 
those who obeyed than anything else, and its long-term prospects turned 
on whether ‘mass discipline’ would continue to trump periodic 
 
47
 Weber, ‘Constitutional Democracy in Russia’, p. 46. 
48
 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 895, p. 875.  
49
 Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 212-54, 266-98.  
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‘explosions’ of ‘undirected mass fury’, a question, Weber said, ‘of 
nerves’.50 As he had reprimanded Michels, the fact was that, even in a 
democratic state, domination of the ruled by the ruler was unavoidable. If 
the genuine self-rule of the people was impossible—a fiction—what other 
possibilities remained?  
The choice reduced, as Weber saw it, to one between ‘leaderless’ 
and ‘leadership democracy’, which he placed in contrapuntal 
relationship.
51
 The former, which Weber associated with Bolshevism, was 
the apotheosis of bureaucratization, the rule of officials in which the mass 
of citizens were ‘‘administered’ like a herd of cattle’ and left ‘without 
freedom or rights’.52 The second responded to what Weber identified as 
‘the essence of all politics...conflict, the recruitment of allies and a 
voluntary following’.53 What it involved in practice was a different 
question, to which Weber offered somewhat different answers at different 
times.  
In the end this was a question about where, if anywhere, the 
leadership he desiderated might be found. Three potential answers 
seemed to present themselves: the monarch, bureaucrats, or politicians. 
The second option effectively collapsed the distinction between leaderless 
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and leadership democracy and so could be discounted.  The first had 
some residual appeal, at least rhetorically, because it implied a source of 
leadership outside the bureaucratic machine and capable of directing it. 
Weber’s avowed support for the principle of monarchy in 1918 reflected 
that appeal, but au fond he was extremely pessimistic about the chances 
of monarchy escaping bureaucracy’s smothering embrace—under ‘the 
conditions of the modern state…no monarch…has ever been, nor can he 
be, a counterweight to and a means of controlling the…power of 
specialised officialdom’54—and withering about the inept dilettantism of 
the Tsar and Wilhelm II and their kind during the First World War. The 
‘special qualities necessary’ for leadership, Weber observed sardonically, 
‘including the strict objectivity, the steady sense of proportion, the 
restrained self-control, and the capacity for unobtrusive action which it 
calls for—these are not necessarily inherited along with the crown’.55  
They were, however, qualities that Weber associated with politicians. 
In ‘Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political 
Order’, written between April and June of 1917, Weber attributed the 
formation and cultivation of those qualities to ‘the machinations of party 
struggle’ in parliament. Parties [he would note elsewhere] presuppose the 
recruitment of a following to a cause by a variety of means both coarse 
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and subtle.
56
 Parliament provides an institutional framework within which 
politicians compete for votes and for eminence, develop their own 
leadership qualities, and in the process create roles of authority, thereby 
filling the vacuum that had opened under Bismarck. It is not ‘the many-
headed assembly of parliament’ as such that governs or makes policy, but 
the leader or leaders whose virtuosity in appearing to harmonize 
competing interests brings success in this competition.  ‘That is how 
things should be’, Weber wrote. ‘This element of ‘Caesarism’ is 
ineradicable (in mass states)’.57 It was this aspect of Weber’s thinking 
that provoked Habermas’s outburst that Carl Schmitt, the Kronjurist of 
the Third Reich, was ‘a ‘legitimate pupil’ of Weber’s’,58 but Weber 
presented it as the only meaningful sense in which citizens could be 
‘integrated into the state by making them its co-rulers’.59   
In two texts of February 1919, ‘The Profession and Vocation of 
Politics’ and ‘The President of the Reich’, Weber offered an alternative 
analysis. He now suggested that parliament, or parliament alone, could 
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not sufficiently train and discipline prospective leaders.
60
  The reasons for 
this change of emphasis—or change of mind—are not entirely 
transparent. One probable cause is that the Constitution of the Weimar 
Republic, which would come into effect on 14 August 1919, specified a 
complicated form of proportional representation.  Weber had been 
involved in discussions surrounding the drafting of the Constitution and 
knew what was in the offing. His intense sensitivity to bureaucratization 
led him to worry that the party lists would be filled by placemen who 
regarded ‘national politics as ‘Hecuba’’, producing ‘a parliament of 
closed, philistine minds, in no sense capable of serving as a place where 
political leaders are selected’. It was therefore essential to find a 
counterweight to parliament. The counterweight he identified was 
plebiscitary leader democracy, whereby politicians would be forced to 
compete directly for the support of a mass electorate, resulting in a ‘head 
of state resting unquestionably on the will of the whole people’.61 
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Weber died of pneumonia in the following year.  The posthumous 
publication of Economy and Society revealed that he understood 
plebiscitary democracy as a device through which the ‘basically 
authoritarian principle of charismatic legitimation’ was transformed in a 
democratic direction.  The validity of charismatic authority, Weber 
contended, rested entirely upon ‘recognition by the ruled, on “proof” 
before their eyes’. The progressive rationalisation of this process brought 
about a remarkable reversal: ‘instead of recognition being treated as a 
consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy: 
democratic legitimacy…the personally legitimated charismatic leader 
becomes leader by the grace of those who follow him…Plebiscitary 
democracy—the most important type of Führer-Demokratie—is a variant 
of charismatic authority, which hides behind a legitimacy that is formally 
derived from the will of the governed. The leader…rules by virtue of the 
devotion and trust which his political followers have in him personally’.62  
In this way, leadership was formed through the electoral process, as 
politicians engaged in a fight to win and retain popular attention and 
acclaim.  The deeply ambivalent character of the process in view, in 
which the personal qualities of politicians were transmuted into 
charismatic authority through their success in a political contest which 
appeared to select for what it in fact produced, found its complement in 
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Weber’s equally ambiguous language: he wrote of a ‘self-selected leader 
of the masses’ (selbstgewählten Vertrauensmann der Massen), a phrase 
which could mean either ‘a spokesman elected by the masses 
themselves’63 or someone who selected himself as worthy of their 
confidence by dint of his own ‘initiative, effort, and capacity to lead and 
direct a political machine’.64 
Weber sweetened this pill by suggesting that electoral competition 
would draw on talent developed in local, associational life, in the sporting 
clubs and hobby groups that made up civil society. But it was not clear, if 
he himself had ever thought it was clear, that this combination of skilful 
political leadership and low-level pluralism could sustain the disposition 
to obedience required for stability on terms compatible with individual 
freedom and democracy as most people understood them: if plebiscitary 
democracy was the specified means of ‘deriving the legitimacy of 
authority from the confidence of the ruled’, Weber nonetheless conceded 
that ‘the voluntary nature of such confidence [was] only formal and 
fictitious’, while ‘its real value as an expression of the popular will’ was 
also open to question.
65
 Once this was recognised, a further question 
arose about why anyone should, in the end, regard the results of any 
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modern democratic process as legitimate. An answer to that question was 
ventured in the writings of Hans Kelsen. 
 
§III 
Hans Kelsen was born in 1881 in Prague, then in the Austrian part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.  His family moved to Vienna in 1883.  After 
reading for a law degree, Kelsen completed a doctorate on Dante’s theory 
of the state, which was published in 1905.
66
 In 1911 he published a 
second book, originally his Habilitationsschrift, a massive study of the 
theory of public law entitled Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre.
67
 
During the First World War he acted as an adviser to the military 
administration and as legal adviser to the War Ministry.  After the war he 
took up a professorship in public and administrative law at the University 
of Vienna. In 1919 he was invited to draft the new Austrian Constitution, 
which was adopted in 1920.  In that document Kelsen gave special 
importance to the role of the Constitutional Court, to which he was 
appointed as a member in 1920, remaining a member for ten years until 
he resigned in protest at political interference with its work.
68
  During this 
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period Kelsen continued to publish on many subjects, including 
sovereignty and the relationship between state and international law, 
laying the groundwork of the ‘pure theory of law’ with which his name 
has come to be inextricably linked.
69
 But he also wrote about the nature 
and prospects of democracy, taking his cue from Weber’s diagnosis of the 
defining characteristics of the modern state, initially in a short essay of 
1920,
70
 later expanded to book length and published in 1929 under the 
same title, On the Essence and Value of Democracy.
71
 
Kelsen began with an observation of fact: ‘Not all those belonging 
to the people as subject to norms or rule can take part in the process of 
norm creation—the form in which rule is necessarily exercised—or can 
form the people as ruling subject. Democratic ideologues themselves’, he 
went on, ‘often do not realize what an abyss they are concealing when 
they identify the “people” in the one sense [as a multitude of persons 
subject to certain norms] with the “people” in the other [as a unified 
ruling entity]’.72  A perfect coincidence of individual wills and the 
provisions of the state would be possible only in the imaginary situation 
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of a state of nature in which unanimous agreement in the form of a 
contract or covenant provided the foundation of political society: since 
real political life was not like that, a different approach was needed. This 
meant the replacement of the principle of unanimity implicit in 
Rousseau’s account of the social contract with a principle of majority, as 
the best available approximation of the ideal of freedom.
73
  As Kelsen put 
it, the idea ‘that, if not all, then at least as many people as possible shall 
be free, that is, that as few people as possible should find their wills in 
opposition to the general will of the social order’ leads rationally to ‘the 
majority principle’.74     
Of course any decision taken by a majority, when understood in 
these terms, requires a restriction of the freedom of those belonging to the 
minority.  But it was just a fact that in modern mass states this kind of 
restriction was necessary for any kind of collective self-government to 
exist in a manner appropriate to place and time.  Since, as Weber had 
recognised, direct democracy was utterly impractical outside ‘the very 
favourable conditions of the Swiss cantons’, democracy had to be 
representative.
75
  For Kelsen this implied a system of parliamentary 
representation, which enabled ‘the formation of the governing will of the 
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state according to the majority principle through a collegiate organ 
[meaning a body of representatives authorised to create or execute legal 
norms] elected by the people…the state’s will is not formed directly by 
the people itself, but by a parliament created by the people’.76  Described 
in this way, parliamentary democracy was a compromise between the 
demands of freedom and the division of labour characteristic of modern 
states.  The facts of political life in modern industrialised societies were 
such that the ‘people’ as such could not rule themselves directly and must 
be content severally and collectively with their allotted role in the 
creation of an ‘organ’ which then determined the will of the state.   
The salient facts were two. The first was that there was no people 
per se. ‘Split by national, religious, and economic conflicts…the unity 
that appears under the name “people”…is—according to sociological 
findings—more a bundle of groups than a coherent mass of one and the 
same aggregate state’.77  The second was that in modern conditions, as 
Weber had once insisted, political parties were crucial. In the 1929 text, 
Kelsen would go so far as to say that modern democracy was impossible 
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without them.  He discerned in anti-party views a poorly-concealed 
animus to democracy and hinted at an ideologically-driven plot by the 
supporters of monarchy to prevent its implementation.
78
 His own view 
was that competition for election between parties which reflected the 
divisions and differences of civil society was the only practicable means 
of arriving at the united will that the ideal of the social contract 
represented in thought and image.  As he put it, political parties were like 
‘many underground streams feeding a river that comes to the surface only 
within the popular assembly or the parliament, where it is directed into a 
single channel’.79 Out of this procedure the will of the state is produced.   
Kelsen repeatedly emphasised that parliament, not the people, 
formed that will. The two had been elided, he suggested, by the ‘fiction of 
representation’. This fiction served ‘to legitimize parliamentarianism 
from the standpoint of popular sovereignty’. It had been a powerful force 
in earlier struggles against autocracy and monarchy, and had held the 
political movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ‘on a 
rational middle course’ by canalising popular aspirations to self-
determination into elected parliaments. But in the long run, Kelsen 
suggested, it played into the hands of parliament’s opponents. For they 
had seized upon the facts to which Kelsen adverted to argue that the 
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democratic ideal of a free sovereign people had been betrayed in practice 
and that the modern parliamentary system ‘promised something it failed 
to carry out’.80 Kelsen retorted with disarming frankness that no such 
promise had been made. Parliament was not and could not be the voice of 
a sovereign people. It was a machine, a ‘specific, socio-technical means 
of creating the state’s order’.81 The lubricant which oiled the wheels of 
this machine was compromise, which Kelsen treated as the corollary of 
his majority principle. 
Kelsen argued that ‘the will of the community formed according to 
the so-called majority principle’ was the result of a ‘clash of political 
wills’.  The ‘entire parliamentary process, with its techniques of dialectic 
and contradiction, plea and counterplea, argument and counterargument, 
aims at achieving compromise’. All parliamentary procedures therefore 
aimed at finding a middle line between the opposing views of majority 
and minority: 
 
Parliamentary procedure creates guarantees that the various 
interests of the groups represented in parliament can raise their 
voices and manifest themselves in a public process...from the 
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confrontation of thesis and antithesis of political interests a 
synthesis is somehow created.  But that cannot mean a 
“higher”, absolute truth, an absolute value above group 
interests, with which parliamentarianism is often wrongly 
saddled by those who confuse its reality with its ideology, but a 
compromise.
82
     
 
As it happened, Kelsen doubted that there was an absolute superior truth 
to be known, offering his own version of Weber’s value pluralism when 
suggesting that consensus about values could only be arrived at by an 
analogous method.
83
  But the commitment to compromise which his 
moral and political theory alike required rested at bottom on the Freudian 
hypothesis of a psychological propensity to engage in compromise 
peculiar to democratic society.  
Kelsen had enjoyed frequent contacts with Freud and his circle in 
Vienna, participating in Freud’s ‘Wednesday Meetings’ and joining the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1911. He used Freud’s analyses in his 
discussions of democracy, postulating that the democratic ‘character’ was 
typified by a relatively reduced sense of ego, extended sympathy, and 
pacifism, and the tendency to direct aggressive drives inward rather than 
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outwards.
84
 Discount this hypothesis, and there may be some reason to 
doubt that whatever ‘general will of the state’ emerged from these 
procedures would readily win the people’s assent.   
What, though, of the will of the people?  For Kelsen, the ‘people’ 
was simply a juridical fiction which answered to the fact that a given 
collection of persons was subject to the same juridical order, to ‘the will 
of a state’.85  But ‘the will of the state’, there again, is also a juridical 
fiction, as, indeed, is the state itself, which is ‘a simplifying 
personification of the legal code which constitutes the social community, 
which forms the unity of a multiplicity of human conducts’.  The idea of 
the state, Kelsen continued, was like that of substance in natural 
philosophy—merely an image that gave intuitive immediacy to what 
upon analysis turned out to be a bounded system of pure relations which 
‘primitive’ minds postulated as something real.86 It may be unnecessary 
to add that if the state was a system of relations, sovereignty could not be 
meaningfully predicated of it.  The rule of law meant just that, the 
sovereignty of law as a self-referring norm, the validity of which was 
found only in procedural consistency.   
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Carl Schmitt did not think of the state in these terms. In his text of 
1923, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, he, like Kelsen, took as 
his starting point Weber’s analogy between the state and a modern 
capitalist enterprise.  But he claimed that Kelsen was one of many who 
had pursued this analogy to conclusions which were potentially 
catastrophic,
87
 developing understandings of politics, parliament, and 
parties which could neither account for nor generate the substantive 
values a stable political order required. In a succession of works, Schmitt 
developed positions about all three which put into question almost 
everything that Kelsen wished to defend.
88
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§IV 
Schmitt began from the metaphysical assumption that political forms like 
the state have real existence.  He used an analogy between the state and 
the church, as against a capitalist enterprise, to establish the distinctive 
character he wished to attribute to the state.  According to Schmitt, the 
state, like the church, was a concrete unity.  That unity rested on two 
principles, which were opposed to one another but which needed to be 
combined together for unity to be possible.  These were, respectively, 
identity and representation.  The archetypal model for their successful 
combination was the medieval Roman Catholic church, which Schmitt 
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described, accordingly, as a complexio oppositorum, a complex of 
opposites.
89
   
Identity implied a condition in which a group of people was 
‘factually and directly capable of political action by virtue of a strong and 
conscious similarity, as a result of firm natural boundaries, or due to some 
other reason’.  In that case, Schmitt went on, ‘a political unity is a 
genuinely present entity in its unmediated self-identity’.90  However, this 
principle could never be realised without its co-operative contrary, since 
the political unity of a people was neither natural nor spontaneous.  It was 
rather the result of a constitutive sovereign decision about friend and 
enemy which established who was embraced within that unity and who 
was not.  In every state, therefore, there had to be a person or persons to 
represent that unity by making present through their public acts the 
otherwise fictional idea that the people could act as a unit, by taking the 
decisions and performing the actions which sustained that people as a real 
unity. 
What this meant was creating ‘total peace’ within the state and its 
territory by producing ‘tranquility [sic], security, and order’, and thereby 
establishing ‘the normal situation [which] is the prerequisite for legal 
norms to be valid. Every norm presupposes a normal situation, and no 
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norm can be valid in an entirely abnormal situation’.91 Schmitt had no 
time for those who spoke, as Kelsen had done, of a ‘sovereignty of the 
law’.92  Law only became valid with the decision that secured the 
foundational unity of the state, and sovereignty was defined in terms of 
that decision: ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.93  This 
definition at once linked sovereignty to an existing order and suggested 
that a sovereign could act outside the norms of that order, including the 
provisions of emergency law, to restore the normal situation when the 
existence of the state was threatened.  In 1934 Schmitt made explicit the 
implied analogy with the medieval papacy: the decisions of the sovereign, 
like those of the infallible pope, presume an existing political form. They 
do not create it ex nihilo: ‘the infallible decision of the Pope does not 
establish the order and institution of the church but presupposes them’.94  
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These same views conditioned Schmitt’s thinking about the Weimar 
constitution.  
A democratic constitution, Schmitt claimed, was the result of an 
exercise of constituent power by a politically united people.
95
 If the 
people did not already exist, he reasoned, it could not give itself a 
constitution, and the same logic bore against treating the constitution as 
expressing the principles of some hypothetical contract or covenant 
between otherwise disunited individuals.  If the constitution was not 
given by the people to itself, it would not be a democratic constitution. 
The Weimar constitution, then, expressed the decision of an already 
existing sovereign people to give itself the form of a state: and so the 
essence of the constitution, Schmitt argued, was contained in its preamble 
and Article 1, rather than in its subsequent articles, those which, as it 
happened, contained provisions for parliamentary government, 
constitutional courts, individual rights and freedoms, and so forth.
96
  This 
argument was lethally double-edged and it had a double effect.  Schmitt 
used one side of the argument to puncture Kelsen’s ambitions for 
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parliament and political parties. He used the other side to fillet Article 48 
of the constitution, which gave the President of the Reich emergency 
powers to secure public order and security, and to stuff it with his own 
distinctive conception of sovereign power to validate presidential 
dictatorship in the name of democracy.
97
   
Parliament, or so Schmitt declared, was no longer a forum where a 
‘will of the state’ could form.  So far from reconciling oppositions to 
produce a united will, it had become the forum of a pluralistic division of 
organized social powers.  Perhaps it had once functioned successfully, in 
the nineteenth century, when its purpose was to integrate the bourgeoisie 
into the monarchic state, but in the conditions of mass society ‘the 
apparatuses and machines’ which had served that purpose were useless.98 
The present situation was one of ‘unpredictable parliamentary majorities, 
incapable of governing…changing from one instance to the next, 
of…innumerable and in all respects heterogeneous political parties 
[which reflected] the pluralistic division of the state itself’, all constantly 
shifting.
99
  Decisions were not taken in parliament at all, but in its 
committees, in which the interests of economically powerful groups were 
traded off in secret, resulting in one compromise after another, 
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compromise being a bottomlessly pejorative term in this context.  
Parliamentarians had become mere delegates of those interest groups, not 
genuine representatives of the people, and the formal provisions of 
contemporary parliamentary law concerning the independence of 
representatives were ‘superficial decoration, useless and embarrassing’.  
It was as if, Schmitt memorably sniped, ‘someone had painted the 
radiator of a modern central heating system with red flames in order to 
give the appearance of a blazing fire’.100 Kelsen’s ‘subterranean streams’ 
were channels of pollution which corrupted parliament and made a 
mockery of the notion of popular sovereignty. 
The Crisis attempted to make this case by turning Kelsen’s own 
reasoning against him. If parliament is no more than an expedient 
answering to the practical necessity of a political division of labour in the 
modern state, Schmitt asks, why cannot the will of the people be 
represented just as effectively by ‘a single trusted representative’ as an 
assembly?  The argument from expediency, ‘without ceasing to be 
democratic’, will also justify ‘an antiparliamentary Caesarism’.101 There 
has to be, he goes on to argue, a deeper reason for favouring an assembly. 
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Reconstructing Kelsen’s steps, he discovers it in a foundational 
commitment to the principle of government by truth.
102
  
Schmitt begins his analysis by fastening on Kelsen’s invocation of 
Weber’s analogy between the state and the modern factory. By equating 
the two, he suggests, Kelsen reduces the political to a shadow of 
economic reality and treats political problems as if they were 
‘fundamentally the same’ as economic problems. It follows that for 
Kelsen the solution is likewise the same in both cases: ‘free competition’, 
the unrestrained clash of opinions in an assembly in the one case and an 
unregulated market in the other—‘everything must be negotiated in a 
deliberately complicated process of balancing’.103 Parliament thus obtains 
its rationale as the place ‘where a relative truth is achieved through 
discourse, in the discussion of argument and counterargument [between] 
multiple parties’.104  
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Schmitt contends, however, that this rationale has been vitiated by 
various changes which began in the nineteenth century and continue to 
accelerate in the present day.
105
 The simulacrum of a complexio 
oppositorum has survived,
106
 but the disconnection of structures from 
deliberation has opened a prospect in which segmental interests battle 
with one another to control state action via rationalised administrative 
processes from which contestation is systematically eliminated. In short, 
an intellectual and practical apparatus sustaining a core of unity has been 
dissolved and a multiplicity of dissonant voices has taken its place. 
Modern parliamentary democracy is exposed as a contradiction in terms: 
it fragments and destroys the popular will that it notionally represents.  
One effect of this contention is to draw attention back to the 
confounding question of unity. In order for a people to be self-governing, 
Schmitt believes, it is necessary that it should be one, rather than a 
disorderly heap of many: it must be subject to a single will—its own—in 
order for the identity of ruler and ruled in which the essence of 
democracy consists to be realised. Kelsen himself had allowed that this 
identity was essential to democracy.
107
 But he was emphatic that, 
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interpreted literally, it was absurd. As we have already seen, by ‘the 
people’ Kelsen meant nothing more than the ‘system of the acts of 
individual human beings determined by the state’s legal order’.  This 
made it natural for him to suppose that in reality there was an 
‘unavoidable distance between the will of the individual and the state 
order’.108 Yet this invites an obvious objection: how is that supposition 
compatible with the claim that the people rule themselves? Kelsen’s 
answer is that precisely because the ‘isolated individual has no real 
political existence,  
 
because he can gain no actual influence on forming the will of 
the state…democracy is possible in earnest only if individuals 
integrate into associations for the purpose of influencing the 
common will from the standpoint of their various political 
goals. Collective groupings which unite the similar interests 
[wants, wills] of their individual members as political parties 
have to mediate between the individual and the state…A 
democracy is necessarily and unavoidably a multi-party state’, 
 
 
unlike Schmitt, located in the preservation of individual freedom and the protection of 
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for by this means alone the ‘normative fiction’ of the people is translated 
into political fact as a single will emerges from the interplay of discrete, 
separated parts within the state.
109
  
 Schmitt counters that this is simply impossible. Unity of the 
relevant kind can never be accomplished through the mere aggregation 
of private wills. Even the ‘unanimous opinion of one hundred million 
private persons’ would not constitute ‘the will of the people’, because 
‘the people exist only in the sphere of publicity’ as a concrete political 
entity.
110
  Schmitt reads into Kelsen’s positions a subversive logic which 
aims to divide and depoliticise the German people through the 
insinuation, both open and concealed, of the pathologies of the private 
individual and his interests into every domain of life and thought.
111
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Worse still, it is succeeding. The practical outcome of those positions is 
a state besieged by rival social and economic forces and the 
disaggregation of the people into a mess of solipsistic individuals and 
particular partisan interests.
112
  
 
§V 
When Schmitt looked about him in 1928 he claimed to see   
 
a people…divided in many ways—culturally, socially, by class, 
race, and religion…The German Reich is primarily a unity for 
paying reparations; it appears as such from the outside.  
However, politically nothing is more necessary than to envision 
the task of integrating the German people into political unity 
from the inside.
113
  
 
 
For the meaning of ‘malign forces’ in this context, see Gross, Carl Schmitt and the 
Jews.        
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Such prognostications were scarcely new. In 1919 Weber had drawn a 
similar inference. ‘Particularism’, he had declared, ‘cries out for a bearer 
of the principle of the unity of the Reich’.114 Traditionally this had been 
the monarch. But the age of monarchy, if not the principle that it 
represented, was gone.
115
 Weber’s preference, we know, was for the 
President of the Reich to fill the vacancy, carried into office on a wave of 
popular support; but popular support cuts both ways: ‘Let us ensure that 
the president of the Reich sees the prospect of the gallows as the reward 
awaiting any attempt to interfere with the laws or to govern 
autocratically’.116 It should also be remembered that his conception of 
plebiscitary democracy was presented as a counterweight to parliament, 
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not as a replacement for it. Indeed Weber predicted that the ‘mighty 
current of democratic party life’ stirred up by the need to organise 
election campaigns before a mass public would ‘benefit parliament’ too. 
He was certain that, whatever its defects, there were some functions for 
which ‘parliaments are indeed irreplaceable in all democracies’. ‘The 
complete abolition of the parliaments has not yet been demanded 
seriously by any democrat’ ran one serenely confident sentence in 
Economy and Society, ‘no matter how much he is opposed to their present 
form’.117  Enter Carl Schmitt.       
Schmitt agrees with Weber that ‘monarchy’s hour has tolled’.118 
But so too, he indicates, has parliament’s. It can contribute nothing to the 
great task in view, the task of unifying the German people, because it is 
an instrument of division, a screen for individual self-assertion and 
sectional interest. It is for the same reason undemocratic. Democratic 
legitimacy, Schmitt maintains, ‘rests on the idea that the state is the 
political unity of a people…the state is the political status of a people’.119  
The purest expression of that unity is found in the direct and unmediated 
expression of the will of a people assembled together, constituting itself 
as a single entity—‘the self-identity of the genuinely present people’—an 
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ideal that Schmitt, like Kelsen, found in Rousseau.
120
 Such purity may be 
unattainable in the extended territory of the modern nation state, as 
Rousseau himself recognised,
121
 but it remains for Schmitt the ‘natural 
form’ in which a people’s will is expressed. In modern conditions, he 
then asserts, this united will is articulated most effectively in public 
acclamation, ‘saying yes or no’, and this acclamation becomes ‘all the 
more simple and elementary, the more it is a fundamental decision on 
their own existence’; in other words, the more closely it approaches the 
ideal.
122
  But the people can acclaim only what is presented to it or, better 
yet, re-presented to it by a spokesman capable of incarnating and 
expressing its own general will. ‘Compared to a democracy that is direct’, 
Schmitt concludes, ‘not only in the technical sense but also in a vital 
sense, parliament appears an artificial machinery…while dictatorial and 
Caesaristic methods not only can produce the acclamation of the people 
but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance and power’.123  
The question Schmitt posed to Kelsen has its answer.  
It is true that Schmitt sometimes made enthusiastic noises about 
Weber’s ‘democratic ideal of a political leader’, an elected President 
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above the party fray and ‘borne by the confidence of the entire people’,124 
but his own view, that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy but 
founded upon it, ought to clarify any vestigial ambiguity on this score.
125
 
His avowed position was that the state, as a substantive body, was already 
disintegrating, and the German people and constitution with it: what 
remained was ‘a highly fragmented pluralized Parteienstaat [with] 
clumps of power subject to political influence’, each seeking ‘to exploit 
the moment of their power’ and using ‘every type of justification as a 
weapon in domestic political struggle…Neither parliamentary legality nor 
plebiscitary legitimacy…can overcome such a degradation to a technical 
functional tool’.  Even ‘the constitution itself breaks up into its 
contradictory components and interpretative possibilities such that no 
normative fiction of a “unity”’—surely he had Kelsen in his sights—‘can 
prevent warring factions from making use of that…constitutional 
text…they believe is best [to] knock…the opposing party to the ground in 
the name of the constitution’.126  
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State, people, and constitution could be restored only by direct 
recourse to the political in its purest sense: that sovereign decision about 
friend and enemy which alone makes substantive existence possible. This 
is why, for Schmitt, the essence of state sovereignty had to be understood 
‘not as the monopoly to coerce’, as Weber had imagined, but ‘as the 
monopoly to decide’.127 Since Article 48 gave the President whatever 
power was needed to secure order in an emergency, and since the 
decision about whether the state exists at all is placed entirely in his 
hands by Schmitt, the state of emergency becomes permanent and the 
President is free to act in whatever way he deems necessary to secure the 
continued existence of state and people. This paradox is captured most 
vividly in Schmitt’s description of the President as ‘guardian of the 
constitution’ precisely because his decision, which transcends all 
constitutional constraints, sustains in existence the people whose will it 
expresses.
128
            
The theoretical reflection Schmitt undertook as part of the great 
task he envisaged therefore led him finally to a conception of politics and 
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political rule very far removed from Weber’s, one in which charisma and 
the electoral contestation which developed it ultimately had little place: 
his extraordinary lawgiver combined ‘legislative and executive 
[power]...in his person. [He was free] to intervene in the entire system of 
existing statutory norms and use it for his own purposes’. The threat of 
the gallows receded to vanishing point.
129
  
By 1935 that great task had been completed in terms that met with 
Schmitt’s evident approval: ‘Today the German people has…become the 
German people again…The state is now a tool of the people’s strength 
and unity. The German Reich now has a single flag…and this flag is not 
only composed of colors, but also has a large, true symbol: the symbol of 
the swastika that conjures up the people’.130 These claims appeared in an 
essay with the title ‘The Constitution of Freedom’. 
Schmitt did not condescend to explain what he meant by freedom 
in the essay. But his other writings in and after 1933 made clear what 
previously had been hedged about or disclosed only to the extent that 
explicit statement was unavoidable to advance the argument in hand: that 
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its meaning included the removal of all existing constitutional protections 
for the individual and the forcible creation of the people’s unity through 
the dispossession and extrusion of its ‘enemies’ and excluded 
parliamentary sovereignty, an independent judiciary, a plurality of 
political parties, and the rule of law.
131
 
Kelsen was one of the many casualties of freedom. In 1933 he was 
removed from his Chair at the University of Cologne on account of his 
Jewish origins. His recently appointed junior colleague, Schmitt, declined 
to sign a letter of resolution in his support.
132
 Kelsen’s landmarks may 
have been crumbling, but his commitment to democracy was unshakable.  
Shortly before his dismissal, he had addressed himself directly to the 
acutely pressing question of how democracy should defend itself against 
enemies who exploited the system to bring it down from the inside—a 
prospect raised, with cunning dialectical negativity, in Schmitt’s 1932 
text Legality and Legitimacy.  Kelsen’s response was that the question 
was answered in the asking: a democracy that seeks to assert itself against 
the will of the majority by force has already ceased to be a democracy.  
How, then, should a democrat act when confronted with this eventuality? 
Kelsen answered emphatically, ‘[He] must remain true to his colours, 
even when the ship is sinking, and can take with him into the depths only 
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the hope that the ideal of freedom is indestructible and that the deeper it 
has sunk, the more passionately it will revive’.133 Kelsen went down with 
his ship. He resurfaced first of all in Geneva, where he worked until 1940, 
returning intermittently to Prague until that, too, became impossible, 
before emigrating to America where he would remain until his death in 
1973. 
In 1955 Kelsen returned again to the question of democracy in a 
long essay published in the journal Ethics. ‘Foundations of Democracy’ 
reaffirmed his commitment to a proceduralist vision of democracy, with 
the majority principle and the protection of the rights of minorities at its 
centre. He issued stern warnings about those who, invoking the will of the 
people and the benefits of ‘leadership’, wished to abandon democracy 
and bring in autocracy under the disguise of a democratic terminology. A 
discreet but cutting footnote remarked that a ‘typical representative of this 
doctrine is the one expounded by Carl Schmitt, who enjoyed temporary 
success as ideologist for National Socialism’.134 Kelsen would not have 
relished the sequel. Today Schmitt is celebrated in many circles as one of 
the most important and penetrating critics of liberal democracy history 
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has produced
135
 while Kelsen’s efforts to defend that democracy in an 
hour of desperate need have been almost forgotten.
136
          
 
§VI 
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to explore the way that Max 
Weber set himself to analyse the contemporary political situation in 
Germany, to suggest an intellectual context which sheds light on that 
analysis, and to use the same context to examine a series of oppositions, 
across a range of issues, between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt.  Recent 
studies of Weber, and the long shadow that his work cast over many 
aspects of the Weimar Republic’s intellectual life, have been much 
preoccupied with the question of whether his later political writings 
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continued the liberal and democratic lines of thought which his 
Anglophone admirers especially had discerned in his earlier work, or 
whether they constitute instead a dramatic volte face towards decisionism, 
authority and anti-parliamentarianism. Is there, in other words, a direct 
path from Weber to Kelsen and beyond, or does the path lead from Weber 
to Schmitt and from there to the pathologies of National Socialism?
137
  
Perhaps this is the wrong question to ask. Weber bequeathed to his 
successors not a set of directions but a set of dilemmas about how to live 
a meaningful life and conduct politics responsibly in the conditions of the 
modern world. In working through those dilemmas they developed 
positions which have exercised a powerful influence on democratic 
theory down to our own day, establishing parameters which continue at 
once to circumscribe and to energise the range of internal movement 
potential in our politics.
138
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Many of Kelsen’s most Weberian claims were repeated by Joseph 
Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy of 1942.
139
  
Schumpeter attacked what he called the ‘classical doctrine’ of democracy, 
according to which the people itself decides issues through the election of 
representatives who identify and implement its general will. About this 
doctrine, Schumpeter made four points. First, that there was no such thing 
as a general will that ‘all people could agree on or could be made to agree 
on by the force of rational argument’. Second, that agreement should not 
be expected because ultimate values could not be decided by rational 
argument. Third, that even if a general will somehow emerged the 
agreement that it superficially embodied would necessarily be 
manufactured rather than natural and lack ‘not only rational unity but also 
rational sanction’. Finally, there was the question of implementation, 
about which no agreement could be expected either.
140
 
As Schumpeter presented it, the political process was completely 
divorced from the pursuit of truth and the common good. What was good 
for one individual or group was not so (and not felt to be so) for another 
and no amount of deliberation, nor any process of aggregation, would 
alter this sociological fact. Schumpeter did not share Kelsen’s optimism 
about the likelihood of compromise between parties and had little 
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patience with schemes for proportional representation, not least because 
he doubted whether any individual was the bearer of interests, 
preferences, or volitions that were sufficiently well-defined or known to 
him for anyone else to represent them.
141
  In view of his deep scepticism 
about the idea that it possessed intrinsic value or could realise any 
popularly imposed goal, Schumpeter defined democracy by the process it 
characteristically employed, being ‘that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’, based 
on the principle that ‘the reins of government should be handed to those 
who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or 
teams’.142 In a democracy, the people do not rule: their role is to elect 
those who do. Schumpeter was moved to wonder how the classical 
doctrine, which was ‘so patently contrary to fact’, could have retained its 
allure for so long and commended his own theory as ‘much truer to life’ 
than its rival.
143
 
The thought that democracy, properly understood, was merely a 
method through which leaders were selected proved irresistibly attractive 
to political theorists of the 1950s and 1960s entranced—as many were—
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by the prospect of a purely descriptive social science. This way of 
thinking enjoyed considerable vogue for a time, providing as it did a 
decisive and reassuringly simple criterion for distinguishing democratic 
arrangements from undemocratic ones, and it spawned in its turn various 
economic and empirical theories of democracy which genuflected to 
Schumpeter as a source of inspiration.
144
 The possibility of a purely 
empirical and value-neutral social science soon came under suspicion, 
however, and with it the pretensions of the empirical theorists of 
democracy to have eliminated all normative considerations from their 
analyses. The very act of description involved an implicit appeal to 
evaluative criteria which, once laid out, led some to question whether the 
Schumpeterian model salvaged enough of what was conventionally 
understood by the term ‘democracy’ to merit the description in the first 
place. Quite what remained of popular sovereignty on his model, for 
instance, was obscure;
145
 likewise why democrats should or would give 
their allegiance to a set of procedures which, on Schumpeter’s own 
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admission, might be less adept at securing outcomes acceptable to all the 
competing groups that comprised the people than a dictatorship.
146
   
Reflecting on these questions, a number of prominent theorists 
began to seek new grounds on which to mount a normative defence of 
democracy. John Rawls initially attempted to vindicate a conception of 
democracy suitable to a just society on terms which set out from the 
different wants and interests of real individuals, but came to realise that a 
bargain among competing groups would not deliver justice:
147
 each would 
‘take a narrow or group-interest standpoint’ rather than aiming at a 
common good.
148
 His first response was to impose a common standpoint 
on all parties through the procedural contrivance of a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
which deprived them of knowledge of their own particular circumstances, 
thereby bracketing the problem of particularism and enabling him to 
present the principles of justice chosen behind the veil as expressing a 
general will common to all similarly situated rational agents. In later 
work he confronted the problem more directly, invoking the principle of 
public reason to explain how citizens, divided on questions of ultimate 
value, could nevertheless deliberate together about matters of public 
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concern and sustain over time an ‘overlapping consensus’ about political 
justice.  
Elaborating his position, Rawls recalled the fate of the Weimar 
Republic which, in his summary account, fell when the members of 
powerful elites abandoned constitutional politics and gave up on the co-
operation needed to make it work. Schmitt was cited in passing;
149
 but it 
soon became evident that Rawls’s flanks were exposed to lines of 
criticism that Schmitt had pressed against Kelsen:
150
 while Rawls 
continued to assign priority to the basic rights and freedoms of 
individuals, not only over procedural rights but also over any collective or 
common good,
151
 self-interested individuality remained ‘the terminus a 
quo and terminus ad quem’ of his conception of democracy and public 
reason reduced to an ideological instrument which masked its own 
service to particular interests and the endless bargaining of such 
interests—of the sort Rawls agreed was incompatible with justice—in a 
highly moralized and misleading language of consensus.
152
  In response, 
some commentators (unwittingly) marched backwards into positions 
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Kelsen had occupied, defending democratic procedures and institutions as 
the best guarantors of equal political freedom among individual citizens 
between whom no consensus should be expected.
153
                  
A somewhat different approach was developed by Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas was as illusionless about Schmitt as he was 
irreverent,
154
 but he shared some of Schmitt’s stated doubts about the 
ability of existing democratic procedures to deliver meaningful outcomes. 
He proposed to identify the conditions under which they might do so. 
These turned out to involve the reinvigoration of institutions and 
principles that Kelsen held dearest, including ‘the significance of 
deliberative bodies in democracies, the rationale of parliamentary 
opposition, the need for a free and independent media and sphere of 
public opinion, and the rationale for employing majority rule as a 
decision procedure’.155 Thus the problem became one of achieving 
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mutual understanding with others about the world of human experience 
and activity rather than harmonising, neutralising, or reconciling 
competing claims or partisan interests. Habermas used the same logic to 
hobble the Schmittian critique of public reason before it left the blocks. 
Democratic principles were not subordinate to, but neither did they seek 
to trump, basic rights and freedoms. Rather they were ‘equiprimordial’ 
and complicit, rights being understood not as individual possessions but 
as relations grounded in mutual recognition and interpersonal action.
156
  
Popular sovereignty was treated in similarly diffusive terms. ‘The 
people from whom all governmental authority is supposed to derive does 
not comprise a subject with will and consciousness’, Habermas insisted. 
‘It only appears in the plural and as a people it is capable of neither 
decision nor action as a whole’.157 As with Kelsen, so with Habermas it is 
only through participation in the procedures of democratic decision-
making that individuals rule themselves. For Habermas this ideally 
implies communicative interaction free from coercion, bureaucratic 
control, or socio-economic subordination. In reality, however, these 
hindrances are always present to some degree, and in recent writings 
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Habermas has acknowledged roles for bargaining, voting, and leadership 
alongside deliberation in the daily life of a democracy.
158
       
The attempt to sublimate popular sovereignty into certain specified 
procedural conditions or discursive processes duly provoked a reaction 
among writers who wished to reintroduce into political theorising the idea 
that the people could act as one, possessing a collective will and being 
capable of expressing it without the mediation of representative 
institutions. Thus Ernesto Laclau, in a work of 2005, could echo Schmitt 
in suggesting that the collective will was represented truly only by a 
figure (or figures) that spoke for the people as a whole, beyond 
parliament and parties, and so achieved the perfect identity of ruler and 
ruled which Schmitt had made the essence of democracy.  Laclau 
likewise bewailed the reduction of the people to a plurality of inconsistent 
interests and values and its debilitation through strangulation in rules and 
procedures.
159
 He wanted to recover and mobilise the people’s potential 
for revolutionary action. Critics have worried that his way of thinking 
leaves little scope for opposing or criticising whatever emerges in the 
realisation of that potential, ‘let alone challenging it through effective 
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political contestation’.160 They also worry about the potential for the 
people to be demobilised, their participation in politics reduced to a 
passive spectatorship that presents an even less effective means of 
contesting political decisions than electoral politics ‘or subordination by 
the hegemonic collective under the representation of a charismatic 
leader’.161 In making these points, it is Kelsen’s positions these critics 
claim to be restating. 
 
§VII 
A recent book announces that we are living in The Time of Popular 
Sovereignty. It tells us that popular sovereignty is the only true ground of 
democratic legitimacy. At the same time it argues that the people is a 
series of events, not a collective agent or an aggregation of persons, and 
so constantly in flux, yet that it is still sovereign; that its decisions are not 
necessarily right, that it does not embody rationality, and that there is no 
intrinsic obligation on the part of citizens to obey it.
162
  Confronted with a 
notion of sovereign power that is simultaneously in nobody’s possession 
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and everyone’s, and in principle binding on none, our first impulse may 
well be to heed the advice of Frank Ankersmit, who has suggested that 
we would do better to ‘abandon the doctrine of popular sovereignty just 
like that of the divine right of kings: in representative democracy…no 
segment of society and no institution…can properly be said to “own” the 
state and the political powers embodied in it’.163  
Sound reasons for firmly resisting that initial impulse were 
enunciated many years ago by R. G. Collingwood, when he observed that 
sovereignty ‘is merely the name for political activity, and those who 
would banish sovereignty as an outworn fiction are really only trying to 
shirk the whole problem of politics’.164 Of course that problem may be 
understood in many different ways. For Schmitt, the problem presented 
itself in the form of a question about how political unity could be 
maintained in the face of an increasingly intense pluralistic struggle of 
interests and ideals. On his assumptions, plurality could never be a 
preface to peaceful co-existence (because plurality implied a variety of 
positions each of whose claims were total) but, rather, was the prelude to 
a contest for survival. Kelsen’s assumptions led him to another 
destination. He found value in plurality and thought it possible for 
civilized people to come together in their differences, giving every 
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political conviction the same chance to be articulated and to compete 
freely to win the hearts and minds of citizens. 
 The conceptions of democracy defended by Kelsen and Schmitt 
complemented their wider positions. Kelsen emphasised the constituted 
power of the people, understanding by the people the individuals who 
play their various parts, above all electoral, in establishing their 
representatives and thus in forming and conditioning the institutions 
which deliver the laws under which they live. Schmitt dwelt upon the 
constituent power of the people, understanding by that same term a united 
body acting as one to give itself constitutional form, receiving its unity at 
the moment of formation from the sovereign power that decides in its 
name.  
So described, their conceptions mirror almost exactly the two 
‘diametrically opposed notions’ symbolising ‘two equally opposed states 
of affairs’ that Sheldon Wolin once identified within democracy: ‘One is 
the settled structure of politics and governmental authority typically 
called a constitution, and the other is the unsettling political movement 
typically called revolution.  Stated somewhat starkly: constitution 
signifies the suppression of revolution; revolution the destruction of 
constitution’.165 A recent commentator notes that Wolin ‘urges us to 
recognize that authentic democracy takes shape exclusively around the 
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latter pole’, that popular sovereignty manifests itself truly only in 
extraordinary moments of collective disobedience and mass protest.
166
 
But would we be wise to follow these urgings?                
My own judgement is that we would not.
167
 For the two notions 
Wolin identifies are not, so it seems to me, alternative opposites each 
giving its own complete understanding of democracy but rather twin 
poles which, through their partnership and interaction, provide both the 
limits and the impetus to our thinking about democracy and our attempts 
to govern ourselves and to shape the course of our common political life. 
Each one exerts a pull which makes itself felt over the full range of 
movement. These limits are not fixed for all time—as we have seen, they 
are the historic deposits of an intellectual and political contest that is 
ongoing—but on any given occasion they are relatively fixed and 
constrain all contesting parties to a certain field of vision and a certain 
range of opportunity.
168
   
At the limit, where the pull of its counterpart is weakest, each 
notion gains a potency through purity and simplicity which ultimately 
disposes it to excess and exposes it to self-defeat: the view is unrestricted 
and the possibilities are sharply polarised. Schmitt saw in the liberal 
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constitutionalist state an empty formalism which encouraged the reign of 
private interest and with it, or so he feared, the kind of enfeebling 
lethargy that overtakes a people when it has given up on politics and on 
the idea of ruling itself. He oriented his theory of democracy around the 
concrete will of a united people, united in and under a leader with 
unchallenged authority. Kelsen saw behind Schmitt’s invocation of 
popular will over and against the existing constitutional order, and in all 
similar attempts to ignore or evade the ‘facts’ of modern political life, 
‘the gaping stare of the Gorgon’s naked power’.169 He denied that the 
people had a will and oriented his rival theory around the protection of 
the rights of minorities and procedures which assured the possibility that 
the minority ‘may at any time itself become a majority’.170  
Each theory, whatever else we might think of it, has the merit of 
illuminating the strengths and weaknesses of its rival; yet each must 
partake of something of the other to be viable. When democratic 
procedures and institutions are systematically unaccountable to the people 
in whose name they operate—when the fact bears no resemblance at all to 
the fiction—they have little to commend them and little capacity to 
compel the adhesion of citizens even in times of relatively untroubled 
stability and security, let alone in times of test; but there is always 
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something to be said for a regime in which, however unsatisfactory it is in 
other respects, we retain the ability at regular intervals, and without 
bloodshed, to remove our governors ‘when enough of us have had more 
than enough of them’.171 It may be that, in the end, in our efforts to realise 
the ideal of a self-governing people we cannot do better than such a 
regime. (We can assuredly do appreciably and dismayingly worse).
172
 We 
cannot doubt, however, that the question of whether and how we might do 
better remains one of the most central questions of contemporary life. To 
shirk it is to shirk the whole problem of politics.   
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